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Greek Ministerial Advisers: Policy Managers, Not Experts?
Athanassios Gouglas
Public Governance Institute, Faculty of Social Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
This article investigates the policy-making role of Greek ministerial advisers. This is achieved
by classifying those actors using typologies developed in empirical studies of political staff in
Westminster systems, according to policy roles, nature and dimension of policy advice activi-
ties, and the policy cycle. This small N comparative study locates the Greek ministerial adviser
in the ministerial cabinet tradition and argues that this agent fits best the role of a coordinator
and policy manager, who vertically steers policy and networks with other political staff across
a fragmented executive core government.
Keywords: political advisers, policy advisers, ministerial cabinet systems, policy advisory
systems, ministerial advisers
INTRODUCTION
Scholarly attention concerning ministerial advisers has
grown steadily in recent years. This is hardly surprising,
given their embedded but controversial role. According to
Shaw and Eichbaum (2013), the dominant orientation of
research to date has been empirical, focusing primarily on
issues of accountability, intra-executive relations, and clas-
sification of political and policy roles. While this is most
definitely the case of research on ministerial advisers in
the Westminster tradition, empirical investigation of min-
isterial advisers in ministerial cabinet systems lags further
behind. The literature focuses on the cabinet structure, as
well as on politico-administrative relations (Brans & Steen,
2006; Carcassonne, 1986; Di Mascio & Natalini, 2013;
Gaffney, 1991; Göransson, 2008; James, 2007; Quermonne,
1994; Schrameck, 1995; Schreurs, Vandenabeele, Steen, &
Brans, 2010; Sotiropoulos, 1996, 1999, 2007; Suleiman,
1974; Vancoppenolle, 2011). However, crucial areas such as
advisers’ policy-making roles and involvement in the pol-
icy process, as well as accountability, remain understudied,
with certain country cases featuring very superficially in the
literature.
The case of Greece is illustrative. Review of the exist-
ing material on Greek ministerial advisers reveals that the
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particular field of study has been seriously under-researched.
Despite public concern over their actions, little attention has
been paid thus far as to the roles, background, expertise,
and policy activities these actors perform as a collective.
What we know, we learn primarily from studies on the
transformation of the top civil service (Tsekos, 1986), from
studies on the evolution of politico-administrative relations
(Sotiropoulos, 1996, 1999, 2007; Spanou, 2001, 2008), and
to a lesser extent from studies on the roles of experts in
various specific policy fields (Ladi, 2005, 2007).
In view of this, the question is raised as to the role of
Greek ministerial advisers in policy-making. Our aim is
to investigate the policy-making role of those actors. Our
overall objective is to add a new empirical case in the lit-
erature. We achieve this in two ways. First, we contextualize
advisers’ work by describing the Greek ministerial cabinet
system and presenting similarities and differences with other
such systems. Second, we assess and classify Greek minis-
terial advisers’ involvement in policy-making, using existing
typologies from the relevant literature.
We designed a single-country, small N, comparative
study, collecting data through a survey questionnaire on
28 ministerial advisers from two ministerial cabinets under
two different Ministers for Development in two separate
office terms in the period 2010 to 2013. In order to triangu-
late our data, we also interviewed the people advisers mostly
frequently work with: the two ministers and four senior civil
servants.
We present our material as follows. First, we describe the
institutional habitat in which advisers operate: the ministerial
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16 GOUGLAS
cabinet. Second, we present the main findings of our sur-
vey and construct our typologies. Third, we conclude with
revisiting our research question and providing an overview,
as well as a discussion of our findings, also providing leads
for future research.
THEORY AND METHODS
Theory
Much like numerous researchers of the adviser phenomenon
in the Westminster tradition have done, we, too, seek to clas-
sify the different policy roles that ministerial advisers play
in the policy process. The use of classifications allows us
to escape the fallacy of a non-comparative, “atheoretical”
study. Classification is a “necessary component of system-
atic comparison,” though, of a higher level than contextual
description, since “it seeks to group many separate descrip-
tive entities into simpler categories” (Landman, 2003, pp. 4,
34). In the present study, we classify advisers according to
two typologies and the policy cycle.
Policy cycle stage
Linking advisers’ activities to the policy cycle stages is a
way to achieve a first systematic interpretation of their pol-
icy advice activity. Where in the cycle are they most active?
In the present study, we use the five stages of the pol-
icy cycle presented by Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009):
(i) agenda setting, (ii) policy formulation, (iii) decision-
making, (iv) policy implementation, and (v) policy evalu-
ation. However, in order to go deeper into what advisers
actually do, we need to gather relevant data and construct
typologies.
Policy advisory roles
According to Connaughton (2010a, 2010b), there are four
types of advisers based on policy advisory roles. Type I
is the expert who is a specialist, is politically passive, and
works on a specific policy field using knowledge, the impact
of his work being expertise. Type II is the partisan who
is responsive to the minister’s mission, highly political in
all dimensions, and closely associated with the minister, his
impact being political dominance. Type III is the coordinator
who is a generalist, politically variable (active or passive),
provides oversight to the government program, and acts as a
fixer, his impact being management. Type IV is the minder
who is a generalist but also responsive to the minister. Unlike
the partisan who is a “party apparatchik,” the minder is the
minister’s bodyguard (Connaughton, 2010a, p. 63) who is
politically active and who “looks for issues potentially harm-
ful” to the minister (Connaughton, 2010b, pp. 351–352). The
impact of the minder is mutuality.
Dimension and nature of advice
Craft (2011, p. 16), in what was an early but interesting
attempt at classifying adviser policy-making activities, has
argued that one important “step towards greater specificity”
would come from classifying political advisers according
to substantive/procedural lines. The substantive dimension
refers to the nature of policy advice activity, and it may
be discerned between technical/administrative and partisan
advice. Administrative advice refers to “traditional rational,
technical and evidence based policy making” and partisan
refers to “electoral, media and public relations aspects” of
advice (Craft, 2011, pp. 16–17). The procedural dimension
refers to the actual dimension of policy advice activity. This
can be vertical, within the department, referring to a tra-
ditional hierarchical command and control activity. Or it
can be horizontal, more cross-departmental, and collabora-
tive, referring to the steering type of activities. Based on
the substantive/procedural dimensions, policy advice-giving
activities were classified into four main categories (Craft,
2011):
• Type I: the administrative/horizontal type refers to
advice that is technical in nature and across depart-
ments and across ministries in dimension
• Type II: the partisan/horizontal type refers to advice
that is political in nature and across departments and
across ministries in dimension
• Type III: the administrative/vertical type refers to
advice that is technical in nature and intradepartmental
in dimension
• Type IV: the partisan/vertical refers to advice that is
political in nature and intradepartmental in dimension
Beyond typologies, we also need to pay attention to institu-
tional context. In contrast to Westminster systems for which
the above typologies were created, Greek ministerial advis-
ers work in ministerial cabinets. As James (2007) has argued,
it is not possible to treat advisers in isolation. Their work is
conditioned by the functions of the civil servants alongside
whom they work. Three models have been suggested (James,
2007; OECD, 2011): (a) advisers work alongside a neutral
civil service (Westminster systems, Sweden, Denmark and
The Netherlands), (b) advisers work alongside a civil service,
where the bureaucracy’s top tier is also politicized (Spain
and the Slovak Republic), and (c) advisers work in ministe-
rial cabinets (France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, increasingly
Spain, and the European Commission).
Methods
We designed our study as a single-country, small N, compar-
ative study. It is comparative because it uses classifications,
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GREEK MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 17
which are the necessary components for systematic compar-
ison, seeking in this way to make larger inferences as to the
policy-making activities of ministerial advisers in ministerial
cabinet systems (Landman, 2003). As such, single-country
studies like the present in hand may be “considered as
part of the larger comparative public administration research
enterprise” (Brans, 2003, p. 425).
Our country here is Greece and the period under inves-
tigation 2010 to 2013. The target population is Greek min-
isterial advisers in civilian non-corps organized ministries,
employed since 2010. As there is no sampling frame for this
population and for reasons of convenience, we applied non-
random purposive sampling. We focus on advisers employed
at the Ministry for Development, which in the period under
investigation merged with three other ministries, creating a
mammoth ministry of the real economy. Given that from
October 2009 to June 2012, there have been five different
Ministers for Development and four different governments,
from which one is a technocratic and one is a caretaker,
we focus on the cabinet advisers under two political, non-
technocrat ministers, whose appointment was not the result
of pre-electoral emergency.
We collected data through a 28-item survey with both
forced-choice and open-ended questions. The questionnaire
was distributed in the beginning of February 2013 to advis-
ers, not administrative support staff, in two ministerial cab-
inets headed by two different Ministers for Development,
who both served at different intervals during 2010–2013.
In the first cabinet, comprising 63 staff, the questionnaire
was distributed directly to 44 advisers through an e-mail list
provided by the chief of cabinet. In the second cabinet, the
actual number of which was not disclosed (official maxi-
mum 58), the questionnaire was distributed via the chief of
cabinet. Overall, we received completed questionnaires from
28 advisers (n = 28). We received 23 out of 44 responses in
the first cabinet and 5 out of 21 in the second, the response
rate being 52% and 23.8%, respectively. The response rate in
the second cabinet was lower than expected, as is the num-
ber of advisers to which the questionnaire was distributed.
The advisers surveyed were predominantly male (67.8%),
in their thirties (57.1%), with a postgraduate level of edu-
cation at master level (67.8%) and drawn from a variety of
educational and professional backgrounds. A quarter of the
interviewed advisers stated they have already been working
as political advisers before moving to the ministry, while a
little less than half stated they had experience from work-
ing in a ministerial cabinet in the past. In order to take as
many perspectives as possible on the phenomenon under
investigation, we also conducted six semi-structured inter-
views with the officials with whom advisers work most
closely: the two ministers and four senior civil servants at the
level of director general and director. The interviews from
which we took detailed notes took place in February 2013 in
Athens, Greece.
THE MINISTERIAL CABINET: THE
INSTITUTIONAL HABITAT OF THE GREEK
ADVISER
The Political Offices of the Minister in Greece (hereafter
ministerial cabinets) form part of a core executive govern-
ment that has been described as fragmented and suffer-
ing from a “deep rooted problem of coordination,” with
the prime minister seen as “primus solus in a setting of
PM centrism,” individual ministers enjoying a considerable
degree of operational independence built on the impera-
tive of their signature, and top civil servants being passive,
“mere observers of the policy process” (Featherstone &
Papadimitriou, 2013, pp. 524, 525). Keeping this setting in
mind, we proceed with locating Greek ministerial advisers
within their institutional habitat, the ministerial cabinet.
Institutionalization
Unlike the older and most representative ministerial cabinet
systems of France and Belgium, which go back in the
nineteenth century, the Greek one was developed only
recently, in the 1980s. However, much like France during
the Restoration, and Belgium, which tried to emancipate
its political class from monarchical influence, the Greek
system was developed under particular political and his-
torical circumstances, in the 1980s, following the first
change of government in the period after the restoration of
democracy in 1974 (Metapolitefsi). The new government
of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) increased
the number of advisers, reorganized political staffs, and
established ministerial cabinets along French lines. The
aim was to circumscribe the administrative hierarchy and
establish political control over what was perceived as a
hostile senior civil service to the aspirations of the new
government (Sotiropoulos, 1999, 2007; Tsekos, 1986).
As with France and Belgium, the Greek ministerial cabinet
system developed on a body of legal provisions that go
beyond minimal regulation found in Westminster systems.
These are codified in Presidential Decree 63/2005 (2005),
which regulates organization, staff status, qualifications,
employment framework, and wider roles. However, as is
also the case with the French Décrets (i.e., amended Décret
n◦48-1233 du 28 Juillet 1948) “legislative restrictions are
frequently overridden by politically accepted norms of
behaviour” (James, 2007, p. 9).
Adviser’s Status
The designation special adviser (Eidikos Symvoulos) refers
to a specific category of ministerial cabinet staff that unlike
most of their colleagues is appointed to a special position
and gets paid at the highest possible pay scale. However,
members of the cabinet, such as special associates (Eidikoi
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18 GOUGLAS
Synergates), scientific associates (Epistimonikoi Synergates),
revocable fixed-termers (Metaklitoi), and seconded civil
servants (Apospasmenoi), can be considered advisers so long
as they are assigned to perform “advisory” tasks by the
minister and not “administrative support” duties. This is con-
firmed by our research findings, whereby only five of our
advisers have the legal status of special adviser, three enjoy
that of special associate, while the majority are scientific
associates (seven), fixed-termers (six), and seconded civil
servants (seven). We observe a similar divide between the
Membres de Cabinet and the Fonctions Support in French
ministerial cabinets. While not rooted into law, the divide
figures in official state documents like the Annex Au Projet
De Loi De Finances pour 2013: Personnels Affectes dans
les Cabinets Ministeriels (Ministère de l’économie et des
finances, 2013).
Cabinet Size
An important characteristic shared with all cabinet systems is
big cabinet size. PD 63/2005 envisages cabinets of minimum
24, 28, and 44 staff according to ministry size and competen-
cies. Size can vary, though, as the law provides for an open
number of staff according to the minister’s needs. Research
on the Ministry for Development, one of the biggest min-
istries in the country, which resulted from the merging of
three former ministries, revealed that from 2009 to 2012, as
the ministry grew, the official cabinet size increased from
33 in 2009 to 40 in 2011 to 58 in 2012. Yet, our research
showed that the actual cabinet numbers were even bigger,
with one of the cabinets numbering 63 staff, out of which
44 performed advisory duties. This, however, is a fraction
of the French cabinets. In 2012, a comparable real econ-
omy ministry like the Ministere d’Écologie, développement
durable et énergie counted 204 staff, out of which there were
28 advisers and 176 administrative support staff, despite
the official limit set at 15 (Ministère de l’économie et des
finances, 2013). Despite functioning on a similar logic, in
respect of size, Greek ministerial cabinets are arguably more
comparable to Belgium before the Copernicus reform, where
advisers reached up to 100 members, and Belgium today,
where a comparable real economy ministry like the Minister
de l’Economie, des Consommateurs et de la Mer du Nord
employs 33 staff (Portail Belgium, 2014).
Relations with the Civil Service
After a confrontational start in the 1980s, when some
civil servants resorted to the supreme administrative court
in order keep political advisers at bay, the 1990s saw
a new form of coexistence among politicians, political
staff, and civil servants (Sotiropoulos, 2007). Spanou
(2001, pp. 109–110) coined this a “symbiotic relation-
ship,” where top civil servants offer political submission
and wide policy discretion to the political executive in
return for taking the civil service’s view into account,
especially in personnel and management issues. Arguably,
this relationship has somewhat evolved during the last two
decades (Sotiropoulos, 2007).
On the positive side, the role of certain experienced
civil servants has been strengthened, while the law made
it explicit that advisers shall not have executive powers
and they cannot command the administration. Some civil
servants see even benefits to advisers.
Of course they are useful. The minister needs advisers with
specific knowledge and expertise, for example in European
Affairs. Can he take this knowledge from the civil servants?
Not always. [Respondent 4]
Without co-administering the state and without co-
deciding with the administration, the adviser enriches
the policy process bringing in new ideas and views.
[Respondent 1]
However, as Sotiropoulos (2007) rightly pointed, despite the
political elite being increasingly forced to take the views of
the civil service into consideration, it has never really lost
the upper hand. Cabinets still dominate the policy process in
Greece, working as a “mini-public administration.”
Given the particular problematic conditions of the Greek
public administration advisers play a bigger role than in
other European member states . . . They form a mini-public
administration doing the job that the normal public adminis-
tration cannot do. [Minister B, own translation]
The situation is comparable to Belgium, where the new
ministerial cabinet rules, after the Copernicus reform, were
implemented in such a way as to “re-invent mechanisms of
political control over the administration” (Brans & Steen,
2006, pp. 77–78).
In addition, advisers appear to issue instructions or man-
age civil servants, especially in view of the timely comple-
tion of policy projects. About 32.1% of the respondents in
our sample of advisers claimed to be managing civil servants
as one of their primary job functions. This is consistent with
a major characteristic of ministerial cabinet systems, accord-
ing to which advisers interfere in the chain of command
issuing instructions and giving orders, exposing “civil ser-
vants to pressures to breach their political neutrality” (James,
2007, p. 9).
As a result, despite perceived benefits, advisers are also
sources of politico-administrative friction.
The role of the adviser is controversial and questionable . . .
Why does a minister need advisers? The minister must have a
personal opinion and own view on policy. There have been so
many negative consequences from advisers’ wrong advice.
[Respondent 2]
Friction though, while a bigger danger in ministerial cabinet
systems, is not always the only game in town. It has been
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GREEK MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 19
argued that in France, the presence of high numbers of very
highly qualified senior civil servants from École Nationale
d’Administration (ENA) in the ranks of ministerial cabinets,
along with an institutionalized culture of accepted politiciza-
tion at the top, is creating a constant politico-administrative
“osmosis” that very often leads to a “bureaucratisation of the
Cabinets” and “the presence of a technocracy at the top of
the state apparatus” (Göransson, 2008, p. 18). This is con-
sistent with Peters’ (1997) observation that France may be
positioned in the village life type of politico-administrative
relations. In our sample of advisers, only one came from the
National School of Public Administration, the Greek ENA.
INSIDE THE CABINET: ADVISERS AND
POLICY-MAKING
In the following section, we are going to indulge into
the details of the advisers’ involvement in policy-making.
We start by using the stages heuristic to locate advis-
ers’ activities to the discrete stages of the policy cycle.
We then proceed with classifying advisers according to
Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b) policy-making roles and
Craft’s (2011) dimension and nature of advice. We conclude
by deriving a new typology using substantive and procedural
criteria in relation to policy roles and activities.
Advisers and the Policy Cycle
Advisers were asked to locate the exact policy cycle
stage where they thought their activities were most impor-
tant. Greek ministerial advisers see themselves as having
extremely important roles in the front end of policy-making,
with 74.9% considering their role in recognition of problems
and agenda setting important and very important, followed
by 71.4% in proposing solutions and formulating policies.
The results confirm Sotiropoulos’ (2007) observation that
ministerial advisers in Greece enjoy extensive political lever-
age to set agendas and formulate policies. An important
finding, in line with what we would expect to find in min-
isterial cabinet systems, is that a chunky 35.6% appears to
have what Howlett et al. (2009, p. 140) described as “voice”
in the decision-making process. Moreover, 60.6% of advisers
in our sample appear to have an important or very important
role in putting solutions into effect, while 53.5% seem to play
an important or very important role in monitoring results.
The above results show that beyond dominating the front
end of the policy process, Greek ministerial advisers see
themselves as having important roles in all stages of the
policy cycle. This is consistent with a central feature of min-
isterial cabinets in France and Belgium, while also Spain
is seen as moving along this path (James, 2007). Cabinets
enjoy a central role in the “design, formulation, implemen-
tation and evaluation of public policy” (James, 2007, p. 17).
Moreover, this observation is also consistent with the past
findings, according to which ministerial cabinets in Greece
tend to play a central role in policy-making (Spanou, 2008).
A Classification of Policy Advisory Roles
We now proceed in classifying Greek ministerial advis-
ers according to four policy advisory roles suggested by
Connaughton (2010a, 2010b): the expert, the partisan, the
coordinator, and the minder. We achieve this by using
collected data on policy expertise, primary job functions,
frequency of activities undertaken, and frequency of tasks
performed in order to describe the main characteristics of
advisers’ roles, suggested as important by the typology: pro-
file (specialist, generalist, or responsive), politics (active,
passive, or variable), communication (technical, political,
or both), policy-making (knowledge, politics, or fixer),
and impact (expertise, political dominance, management, or
mutuality). Where appropriate, we triangulate our data with
interview material.
Profile
Is the profile of the Greek ministerial adviser that of a
specialist, a generalist, or is it simply responsive to the min-
ister’s mission? As the typology suggests, a specialist is
a qualified expert in a specific policy field relevant to a
ministry’s competencies, not a technical expert in a certain
domain of competence. In view of this, we asked advisers to
describe whether, according to the work they do in the min-
istry, they felt they fit in more appropriately to the role of a
generalist or that of a specialist. Based on their answers, spe-
cialists and generalists seem to be balanced, with specialists
(15) marginally overtaking the generalists (13). In order to
better understand advisers’ self-perception as specialists, we
asked them to define their exact area of specialization. From
the advisers who stated they are specialists the majority, six
(40%), stated that they specialize in a ministry portfolio, four
(26.6%) in law, and another four in media and communica-
tion, while only one (6.6%) stated s/he specializes in generic
public policy. Furthermore, in the open comment section of
the stated question, five (33.3%) advisers stated that they
specialize in a second field too. Two of them described a min-
istry portfolio-related specialization. What the above results
tell us in relation to the real level of policy expertise is
that within the sample of 28 advisers, there are only eight
experts (28.57%) in some particular departmental policy-
related field. Thus, while our advisers appear to be technical
experts in various areas of competence, their work profile in
relation to the ministry’ s competencies can be argued to fit
that of a generalist.
Policy making
Is the Greek ministerial adviser a fixer, facilitating the over-
sight of the ministry’s agenda? Does the policy role of
this actor rely on knowledge or politics? Or is the Greek
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20 GOUGLAS
ministerial adviser policy passive, simply minding the min-
ister? In order to understand this, we asked advisers to point
to their primary job functions, as well as state the time
spent in certain activities and tasks. The data in hand reveal
beyond doubt that Greek ministerial advisers are highly
policy active.
In order to shed light into advisers’ policy-making activ-
ities, we begun by asking them to point to one or more
functions, which they considered as their primary job func-
tions. As advisers usually carry out multiple and overlapping
functions, the objective here was to reflect this very real-
ity. “Administering projects and project management” was
selected as a primary job function for 71.4% of respondents.
Following this, 42.8% selected formulating policy measures,
39.2% providing strategic advice, 35.7% providing advice
on political considerations, and 32.1% coordinating rela-
tions with stakeholders, while an equally high percentage
selected management and administration of civil servants as
their primary job functions. Finally, 28.5% appear to share
communication and media as their primary job function.
We observe here that what Greek ministerial advisers do
ranges from managing projects, coordinating relations with
stakeholders, providing strategic, and communication advice
to indulging with the nuts and bolts of policy. This is in line
with the observation of Schreurs et al. (2010, p. 19) accord-
ing to which ministerial cabinet advisers, beyond being
experts, also play an “important role in developing policy
strategy, coordinating relations with stakeholders, media and
interest groups.” However, the finding of importance here is
that the primary job function most selected by the majority
of advisers is “administering and managing projects” (see
Table 1).
Following primary job functions, we asked advisers to
indicate the frequency of performing certain activities and
then tasks. According to their answers, 50% of the advis-
ers in our sample appear to coordinate and manage policy
work, the cabinet staff, or civil servants on a daily basis.
A smaller, yet significant percentage, 35.7%, appears to per-
form policy technicalities such as drafting or processing
laws, researching, and formulating solutions on a daily basis
(see Table 2).
The data on frequency of tasks performed also show that
Greek ministerial advisers appear to be focused on steering
TABLE 1
Advisers’ Primary Job Functions (%), n = 28
Job function n (%)
Giving strategic advice 11 (39.2)
Coordinating relations with stakeholders 9 (32.1)
Advising on political considerations 10 (35.57)
Providing media and communication advice 8 (28.5)
Formulating policy measures 12 (42.8)
Managing projects 20 (71.4)
Managing civil servants 9 (32.1)
No answer 1 (3.57)
tasks, as well as the nuts and bolts of policy-making within
their department. As Connaughton (2010b, p. 358) argues
“these are tasks that the ministers would do themselves if
they had the time or would not be inclined to delegate to
an apolitical civil servant.” On the steering side, advisers
appear to frequently and very frequently meet departmen-
tal officials (78.5%), as well as attend meetings with civil
servants (67.8%), ask officials to provide memos or advice
(67.8%), monitor the implementation of policy (35.67%),
and meet advisers from other ministerial cabinets (74.75%).
On the more technical policy side, advisers appear to read
and comment on departmental advice (64.2%), analyze and
evaluate implemented policy (50%), prepare policy files and
memos (42.77%), and produce evidence and facts in support
of policy-making (42.8%).
Our data reveal that there is definitely a strong techni-
cal policy side to the work of the Greek ministerial adviser,
which should not be downplayed. However, the policy steer-
ing dimension of those actors’ work is arguably stronger.
Interviews with the two ministers and the senior civil ser-
vants revealed this very reality.
According to Minister A:
The adviser is a gear, a timing belt in the government
machine. His basic function is policy acceleration, monitor-
ing and supervision. He is neither an agenda setter, nor a
policy formulator. [Own translation]
Referring to his expectations from advisers, Minister B
stated:
TABLE 2
Frequency of Activities Undertaken by Advisers (%), n = 28
Activities Never
A couple of
times per year Once a month Once a week Every day
Policy technicalities (drafting or processing laws,
researching, formulating solutions etc.)
6 (21.4) 2 (7.1) 1 (3.57) 5 (17.8) 10 (35.7)
Coordination and management (of policy work, the cabinet
staff, civil servants)
2 (7.1) 2 (7.1) 1 (3.57) 6 (21.4) 14 (50)
Politics (party, MPs, minister’s electoral district, networking) 7 (25) 7 (25) 4 (14.3) 5 (17.8) 2 (7.1)
Media and communication 5 (17.8) 6 (21.4) 3 (10.7) 3 (10.7) 9 (32.1)
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GREEK MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 21
I want advisers to monitor the development of policy in
a particular field. I want them to provide input and then
monitor the evolution of policy. Ideally they should be able
to formulate policy too, but in this, the role they can play
here depends on their individual capabilities and knowledge.
[Own translation]
The importance of policy steering has sprung up in one
of our interviews with top civil servants. According to
respondent 3:
Advisers are involved in the implementation of policy
too. Whereby implementation means supervision, time-
line, project management, monitoring of deadlines. [Own
translation]
Not disregarding their involvement with technical policy
tasks, we can safely conclude at this point that advisers in our
sample are “fixers,” who mend, monitor policy, and intervene
(Connaughton, 2010b, p. 365).
Politics
Is the Greek ministerial adviser’s political role active, pas-
sive, or variable? The questions asked above on primary job
functions, as well as on the frequency of time spent in dif-
fering activities and tasks, contain data on advisers’ political
role too. Based on this, we argue that the Greek ministerial
adviser’s political role is variable.
To begin with, 35.7% of advisers appear to provide advice
on political considerations as one of their primary job func-
tions. However, what is impressive is how little time Greek
ministerial advisers seem to spend in overt political activi-
ties, with only 7.1% stating that they do this on a daily basis.
In addition, the time spent on overt political tasks shows
that the majority never or rarely maintain relations with the
electoral district of the minister (67.8%), or the grassroots
support of the minister (85.7%), while they also never or
rarely meet with party officials (78.57%) or with Members of
Parliament (64.2%). While this is not the case with the Irish
advisers (Connaughton, 2010b), it appears to be the case
with those in New Zealand (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007). More
importantly, the above results are puzzling, given the politi-
cized nature of ministerial cabinets, as well as the fact that
35.7% of our sample’s advisers provide advice on political
considerations.
Is the Greek ministerial adviser apolitical? The data reveal
that s/he is definitely non-partisan in the sense of being
a “party apparatchik.” We may at this point suggest an
explanation. “Advice on political considerations” is rightly
understood by advisers of our sample as advice related to
the public interest aspects of policy-making. On the con-
trary, politics in the above-mentioned question refers to party
politics and the political executive’s electoral fortune, which
in this respect relates to partisan politics. In Greece, overt
political work of the partisan type, for example elections,
maintaining support for the minister and relations with the
party, is mainly outsourced to the political-electoral office
(Vouleftiko Grafeio) that the minister maintains as a Member
of Parliament. This office is staffed under a different statu-
tory framework and follows different political needs. To
illustrate this point a bit further, it is often the case that the
two offices (the ministerial cabinet and the political office
of the member of parliament, both belonging to the same
politician) antagonize each other, at times even exchanging
criticisms for being apolitical technocrats or over-politicized
party partisans, respectively. It is only at times close to an
election that the cabinet staff may reorientate their focus to
more partisan tasks.
Despite not being overtly partisan, though, Greek ministe-
rial advisers, who advice on political considerations (35.7%),
do also seem to perform certain political tasks. About 32.1%
state that they frequently and very frequently represent the
minister in departmental meetings. About 28.57% raise new
policy initiatives with the minister, 21.4% receive external
delegations on the minister’s behalf, and 28.4% broker meet-
ings with interest groups. However, as we previously saw
in relation to their policy-making roles and will analyze
in respect of their communication ones, the main political
roles of the interviewed advisers are confined within pol-
icy steering and communication functions and tasks, such
as conveying the minister’s wishes, meeting departmental
officials, and advisers from other ministries.
Communication
The question then is raised, whether the communication role
of the Greek ministerial adviser reflects political or technical
characteristics, or maybe both? Advisers’ answers on pri-
mary job functions and the time spent on tasks show that the
way those actors communicate is policy focused involving
both technical and political content considerations. On the
more political side, we already saw advisers’ role in directly
managing civil servants as part of their primary job func-
tion (32.1%). Additionally, most advisers appear to convey
or clarify the minister’s wishes (57.1%), meet departmen-
tal officials (78.5%) to ensure that policy remains on track,
as well as meet advisers from other ministerial cabinets
(74.75%) in order to deal with cross-cutting issues that tran-
scend the ministry’s boundaries. A smaller yet significant
number of advisers appear to be involved in writing press
statements (32.1%) and speeches (21.3%). On the more tech-
nical side, advisers appear to frequently and very frequently
ask officials to provide memos or advice (67.8%) and attend
meetings with civil servants (67.8%) to talk about the nuts
and bolts of policy, while as we saw when analyzing their
policy-making role they spend time reading and commenting
on official departmental advice (64.2%).
Impact
In the end, we may argue that the impact of the adviser of our
sample is primarily on management, rather than expertise,
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PROFILE POLITICAL COMMUNICATE POLICY-
MAKING
IMPACT ROLE
Generalist Variable Both political 
and technical
Fixer Management Coordinator
FIGURE 1 Classification of Greek ministerial adviser according to policy role.
Policy advice 
↑
Policy formulation
implementation 
↓
steering?
POLICY STEERING
EXPERT PARTISAN
Greek Ministerial Advisers
COORDINATOR              
MINDER
Technical/management ← Communication → Political
BOTH verging slightly toward technical/managerial
FIGURE 2 Classification of Greek ministerial adviser according to policy role.
political dominance, or mutuality. Advisers in our sample fit
the picture of fixers within the policy-making process, who
are not overtly partisan, but are politically aware, concen-
trating primarily on managing the ministry’s program and
ensuring that policy output remains on track.
In Figure 1 we can see a summary of the characteristics of
adviser roles. It is evident that the Greek ministerial adviser
fits best in the coordinator type.
Figure 2 depicts the positioning of the Greek ministe-
rial adviser along the two axes of Connaughton’s (2010b)
typology matrix.
A Classification of Policy Advice Activity
Following the suggestion of Craft (2011, p. 14), “a further
step towards greater specificity” may be taken by examin-
ing the nature and dimension of policy advice along sub-
stantive (administrative-partisan) and procedural (vertical–
horizontal) lines.
Nature of advice—substantive
Is the Greek ministerial adviser’s policy-giving activities
partisan or technical/administrative?
Remapping the above collected data along the new clas-
sification needs, we see that Greek ministerial advisers
appear not be involved in any significant overt political
partisan activities, given that these are mainly the task of
the ministers’ Vouleftiko Grafeio. However, they do not fall
within the technical/administrative category either. Despite
an important technical aspect to their policy work that should
not be downplayed, their policy role does not fit the rational,
evidence-based policy-making contributions that this typol-
ogy associates with technical/administrative advice-giving
activities. The data in hand tell us that the Greek ministerial
advisers’ policy-making activities comprise important tech-
nical elements, but are predominantly of the steering nature.
As a result, the nature of advice is not adequately captured
by this typology.
Dimension of advice—procedural
Moving now to the dimension of policy advice, we may
argue that Greek ministerial advisers work mainly along a
vertical dimension. Advice giving appears to focus more
on intradepartmental command and control type of activi-
ties, rather than those of a horizontal steering nature. The
vertical focus of their work is reflected mainly in the time
spent meeting with departmental officials, asking officials to
provide memos or advice, attending meetings with civil ser-
vice (CS), and conveying/clarifying minister’s wishes (see
Table 3).
This finding is then strengthened by the much less time
spent liaising and networking with political stakeholders
(who never or rarely meet party officials and MPs) and civil
society stakeholders (who never or rarely broker meetings
with interest groups). As a result, we cannot argue that the
horizontal dimension of our advisers’ activities is “germane
to investigations of governance” as the typology suggests
(Craft, 2011, p. 16).
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TABLE 3
Tasks Undertaken by Greek Ministerial Advisers and their Frequency (%), n = 28
Tasks Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very frequently
Ask officials to provide memos or advice 0 (0) 1 (3.57) 7 (25) 13 (46.4) 6 (21.4)
Assist with budgetary matters 14 (50) 6 (21.4) 4 (14.2) 2 (7.1) 0 (0)
Attend meetings with civil servants 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (28.57) 12 (42.8) 7 (25)
Broker meetings with interest groups 4 (14.2) 5 (17.8) 10 (35.7) 4 (14.2) 4 (14.2)
Convey or clarify minister’s wishes 1 (3.57) 0 (0) 10 (35.7) 10 (35.7) 6 (21.4)
Maintain relations with the electoral district of the minister 12 (42.8) 7 (25) 5 (17.8) 3 (10.7) 0 (0)
Meet with MPs 11 (39.2) 7 (25) 6 (21.4) 2 (7.1) 1 (3.57)
Meet with party officials 14 (50) 8 (28.57) 3 (10.7) 3 (10.7) 0 (0)
Analyze and evaluate implemented policy 4 (14.2) 5 (17.8) 3 (10.7) 13 (46.4) 1 (3.57)
Meet advisers from other ministerial cabinets 0 (0) 1 (3.57) 5 (17.8) 15 (53.35) 6 (21.4)
Meet with departmental officials 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (17.8) 12 (42.8) 10 (35.7)
Write press statements 7 (25) 5 (17.8) 4 (14.2) 6 (21.4) 3 (10.7)
Raise new policy initiatives with minister 5 (17.8) 7 (25) 6 (21.4) 6 (21.4) 2 (7.1)
Read and comment on official departmental advice 2 (7.1) 4 (14.2) 3 (10.7) 13 (46.4) 5 (17.8)
Represent minister at departmental meetings 5 (17.8) 7 (25) 7 (25) 6 (21.4) 3 (10.7)
Write speeches 12 (42.8) 5 (17.8) 4 (14.2) 4 (14.2) 2 (7.1)
Receive external delegations on the minister’s behalf 5 (17.8) 8 (28.57) 8 (28.57) 3 (10.7) 3 (10.7)
Prepare policy files and memos 8 (28.57) 2 (7.1) 5 (17.8) 8 (28.57) 4 (14.2)
Monitor the implementation of policy 8 (28.57) 6 (21.4) 4 (14.2) 8 (28.57) 2 (7.1)
Maintain relations with the grassroots support of the minister 14 (50) 10 (35.7) 3 (10.7) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Produce evidence and facts in support of policy making 7 (25) 6 (21.4) 2 (7.1) 9 (32.1) 3 (10.7)
Other (please specify) 1 (3.57)
Support
departments
do their work
However, one finding should not go unnoticed. The
majority of the interviewed advisers (74.75%) appear to
meet very frequently or frequently with their colleagues from
other ministries. This is in line with findings in both min-
isterial cabinet and Westminster systems. In relation to the
former, James (2007) observes that cabinets facilitate inter-
ministerial policy coordination, thanks to the formation of
a strong network between cabinets. Referring to France, he
points to the fact the cabinet staff settle inter-ministerial dis-
agreements. In Belgium too, cabinet staff serves as conduits
of negotiating important policy decisions between ministers.
In Westminster systems, Maley (2011) observes that advisers
also develop relationships with other political staff, forming
networks within the executive. As such, they can enhance
coordination in a segmented executive core government like
the Greek one.
In the end, the questionnaire data point to the direc-
tion of classifying the Greek ministerial adviser in the
Administrative-Vertical category. This, however, is a classi-
fication we need to be wary about since it does not capture
what the Greek adviser’s policy advice activity is, but rather
what it is not. It is not partisan and definitely not horizon-
tal in the governance way. However, our sample’s adviser
is not detached from politics, while networks with political
staff across the core executive government. To argue that as
a result of Greek ministerial adviser’s policy advice activity
is technical and fully vertical is not supported by the data in
hand either.
Rethinking Classification of Policy Advice Activity
Along Substantive and Procedural Lines
The main merit of the typology developed by Craft (2011)
is that it highlights the substantive nature and procedural
dimension of policy advice-giving activities. However, it
is arguably a classification with limitations. Focusing on
the dichotomous logic of technical versus partisan and ver-
tical versus horizontal advice-giving activities, it misses
out on a whole category, that of policy management or
less overt partisan ones. As a result, while we are able
to highlight the aspects of the phenomenon in hand, we
have not yet taken a step forward toward greater specificity.
Staying within the limits of policy advice-giving activities
in terms of nature and dimension of advice, the typology
could be improved along the following lines. We reconstruct
the substantive dimension so as to reflect Connaughton’s
(2010a, 2010b) policy-making roles: from the pure expert
(technical/administrative nature) to the coordinator, the min-
der, and finally the partisan. Moreover, we reconstruct the
procedural dimension of policy advice-giving activity using
Maley’s (2013) three arenas where the policy work of polit-
ical advisers appears to be more prominent: (a) working
within the department, (b) working with other ministers
within the core executive government, and (c) working
with stakeholders. The once vertical/horizontal dimension
of advice is now substituted by three new types: vertical silo,
vertical with coordination, and governance. In this respect,
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Procedural
(dimension of policy advice 
activity)
HORIZONTAL
VERTICAL
Substantive
Nature of policy advice contribution
ADMINISTRATIVE                   PARTISAN
Type I
Administrative—Horizontal
Type II
Partisan—Horizontal
Greek Ministerial Adviser
Type III
Administrative—Vertical
Type IV
Partisan—Vertical
FIGURE 3 Classification of Greek ministerial advisers’ policy advice activity according to the nature and dimension of advice.
Procedural
(dimension of
policy advice
activity)
Substantive
Nature of policy advice contribution
Administrative
/technical
(expert)
Managerial/Stee
ring
(coordinator)
Political
(minder)
Partisan
Vertical silo
(working
exclusively
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
with the
department)
Vertical with
coordination
(working also
with other
ministers within
the political
executive)
Type V Type VI
Greek 
ministerial 
adviser
Type VII Type VIII
Governance
(working with
stakeholders)
Type IX Type X Type XI Type XII
FIGURE 4 Twelve types of policy advice-giving activity.
we derive a typology with 12 types of policy advice-giving
contributions (Figure 3). Despite losing in simplicity, we
gain in capturing what Maley argued to be a “highly vari-
able and highly contingent” nature of policy work (Maley,
2013, p. 3). We still retain the merits of classification though,
especially the ability to use the different types for meaningful
cross-country comparisons, as well as hypothesis generation.
In relation to the latter, based on the suggested typology, we
would expect advisers’ type of policy advice-giving activity
to vary according to a set of factors both contextual-structural
and agency based: the institutional setting in which their
work is organized (ministerial cabinet, Westminster model
etc.), the field of policy, the minister’s needs, but also their
background and expertise (see Figure 4).
CONCLUSION
In the present study, we investigated the phenomenon of
Greek ministerial advisers in the policy-making process.
We described the institutional habitat of those agents, the
ministerial cabinet, highlighted the policy cycle stage where
their work is more prominent, and classified their policy
work according to typologies focusing on policy advisory
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GREEK MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 25
roles, as well as on the nature and dimension of their policy
advice-giving activities.
Greek ministerial advisers belong to ministerial cabinets,
which form part of a fragmented core executive govern-
ment, characterized by prime minister centrism, independent
ministers, and a passive bureaucracy. In this respect, it has
been argued that Greek executive core government reflects
more the “solitary centers” in central Europe that resist the
imperative of coordination (Featherstone & Papadimitriou,
2013, p. 523). Yet, when we look into advisers’ institu-
tional habitat, the ministerial cabinet, in Greece, we see
that it shares fundamental similarities with the older and
more representative ministerial cabinet systems of France
and Belgium.
• It is institutionalized in particular historical and politi-
cal circumstances associated with the first period of the
restoration of democracy in the 1980s.
• Despite been grounded into law, legislative restrictions
are often overridden by widely politically accepted
norms. This is the case as to who performs advisory
duties. Special advisers as well as political staff in
administrative support contracts and scientific asso-
ciates often play an advisory role. This is even more
the case with ministerial cabinet size, which can vary
according to need.
• It forms a “mini administration,” the staff of which
apart from advice also attempts to manage the civil ser-
vice, and this may be a source of a constant friction
among members of the ministerial cabinet and civil
servants.
• It dominates policy-making at all stages. Examination
of advisers’ location in the policy cycle revealed that
while they appear to deal predominantly with the
front end of policy-making, agenda setting, and policy
formulation, they also enjoy a “voice” in decision-
making, while a much bigger number is involved in the
back end of the policy-making process, in particular
implementation and evaluation.
Yet, important differences especially in comparison to the
French Cabinets Ministeriels do exist. To begin with, Greek
ministerial cabinets are a much more recent phenomenon. In
terms of size, they are significantly smaller than the French
ones, much closer to those we find in Belgium. Moreover,
relations between advisers and civil servants may be charac-
terized “symbiotic,” but in no case do they reach the “village
life” type of no confrontation and osmosis found in France.
Last but not least, advisers in ministerial cabinet systems are
thought to fit the type of technical experts in comparison to
strategic advisers found in Westminster systems and media
aides or political assistants found in countries such as The
Netherlands (James, 2007; Schreurs et al., 2010). Contrary
to the idea of ministerial cabinet technocracy, classification
revealed that the Greek ministerial adviser:
1. Belongs to the “Coordinator” type. He is predomi-
nantly a generalist with a main focus on management
of the government program. This project management
aspect of the Greek ministerial adviser’s job is a sig-
nificant finding. First, it shows that Greek ministerial
advisers do not fall within the traditional partisan
political adviser category. It is not elections and the
minister’s constituency they most deal with, since this
is dealt by the political executive’s office as an MP
(Vouleftiko Grafeio). Second, despite predominantly
dealing with policy projects and while they seem to
be involved to a great extent with policy technicali-
ties, they are not the technical experts that we would
expect to dominate in a traditional cabinet system. One
explanation for this is related to the personal styles
of the two ministers under examination, who place
great emphasis on acceleration, management, coordi-
nation, and an understanding of policy as made of
single projects that need to be designed and imple-
mented as such. Another might be the simple reality
that policy-making in Greece is highly political, with
reform time always trying to catch up to political time,
therefore characterized by a lack of technical, rational,
and evidence-based policy-making activities while in
constant need for immediate swift action and results.
We may argue that the literature on the role of experts
in policy-making in Greece lends some support to
this explanation (Ladi, 2005, 2007; Monastiriotis &
Antoniades, 2009; Spanou, 2008).
2. Does not perform policy advice-giving activities of a
partisan nature, nor of a governance-type horizon-
tal dimension. In order to positively classify advis-
ers’ policy advice-giving activities along substantive
and procedural lines, we reconstructed Craft’s (2011)
typology, retaining its general philosophy, but synthe-
sizing insights from Connaughton’s (2010a, 2010b)
policy roles and Maley’s (2013) policy arenas to reach
a map of 12 types of advice-giving activities. The new
typology reveals that the Greek ministerial adviser is a
policy manager who liaises primarily with colleagues
and peers within the core executive government, but
to a lesser extent with political and civil society stake-
holders.
Finally, in view of the findings presented in the current
research, we need to be careful before claiming that they
may be generalized to the broader population of Greek min-
isterial advisers in civilian non-corps organized ministries.
Arguably, at a first level, the existing empirical gap was
closed. The Greek ministerial adviser works within a min-
isterial cabinet context and appears to fit best the role of
a coordinator and a policy manager, who vertically steers
policy, as well as networks with other political staff across
ministerial cabinets that form part of a fragmented executive
core government. However, our results would need to be put
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26 GOUGLAS
to the test. Future research on Greek advisers can expand its
scope to investigate more and different ministerial cabinets
in different time periods and using different research meth-
ods. In respect to the conceptualization of advisers’ policy
making roles, attempted through the use of classifications,
the new typology we presented above may have the merit
of a more exhaustive synthesis along substantive and proce-
dural lines but begs for further elaboration and fine tuning.
More substantively, future research needs to address a para-
dox. Given that our investigation inside the cabinet reveals a
lack of technical expertise in policy-related issues, it would
be interesting to investigate where this expertise might be
coming from, if at all, within the broader Greek policy advi-
sory system? In addition, the work of advisers’ with other
ministries, as well as with non-core executive stakeholders,
needs further exploration. To conclude, on a more practical
tone and if we may suggest a course of action to Greek min-
isterial advisers, this would be to become more active in the
horizontal coordination of external sources of policy advice,
whether these are found in academic, professional, interest
group, and civil society expertise or in political institutions
such as the Parliament and political parties.
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